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PROPERTY LAW
Susan M. Pesner
Martin C. Conway**
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1997 proved to be exceptional in the relatively quiet
area of property law.' After a number of failed attempts, bills
addressing the unauthorized practice of law were finally pre-
sented to the General Assembly and passed. Effective July 1,
1997, the Commonwealth of Virginia will regulate residential
real estate settlements for the first time in its 390-year history.
While the Supreme Court of Virginia issued many opinions
touching upon real estate in 1997, the bulk of the supreme
court's decisions merely clarified points of law and have no
substantive effect. The same cannot be said for the supreme
court's separate decisions concerning zoning, condemnations and
the patent grants of British monarchs. This survey also discuss-
* Principal, Gordon & Pesner, LC., McLean, Virginia. BA, 1973, American
University; J.D., 1976, Washington College of Law of American University. Ms.
Pesner is the immediate Past Chair of the Board of Governors of the Real Estate
Section of the Virginia State Bar. Ms. Pesner was an appointed member to the Vir-
ginia State Bar Subcommittee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law Guidelines creat-
ed pursuant to legislative mandate under the Consumer Real Estate Settlement Pro-
tection Act
** Associate, Gordon & Pesner, L.C., McLean, Virginia. B.S., 1989, Louisiana
State University, J.D., 1992, George Washington University Law School. Mr. Conway
clerked for the Honorable Gerald B. Lee of the Fairfax Circuit Court. He is currently
a member of the Legislative Committee of the Fairfax Bar Association and engages in
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Traver, Esq. of McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, L.LP., who graciously allowed the
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1. This survey article covers state legislative and judicial developments concern-
ing real estate from June 1996 to June 1997.
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es numerous circuit court opinions since the lower court deci-
sions provide much guidance to the real estate practitioner.
II. LEGISLATION
A. The Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act
The Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act2
(CRESPA) was enacted in the 1997 legislative session and be-
came effective July 1, 1997. Its purpose is to "authorize existing
licensing authorities in the Commonwealth of Virginia to re-
quire persons performing escrow, closing or settlement services
to comply with certain consumer protection safeguards relating
to licensing, financial responsibility and the handling of set-
tlement funds."3 In response to a 1995 request by Michael M.
Mannix, Chair of the Real Estate Section of the Virginia State
Bar (VSB), the Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law issued Draft Opinion UPL 183 in
1996. Draft Opinion UPL 183 limited the right to conduct a
real estate settlement to lawyers only. The VSB Council recom-
mended to the Supreme Court of Virginia that it adopt UPL
183. In Virginia, the authority to define the practice of law is
granted to the Supreme Court of Virginia.4 However, the Gen-
eral Assembly has in the past modified or limited this delegat-
ed authority.5 Accordingly, those at odds with the position tak-
en in UPL 183 petitioned the General Assembly in an effort to
protect their economic interests.
In the 1996 and 1997 General Assembly sessions, a legisla-
tive slate was brought forward by the Virginia Real Estate
Attorney's League (VAREAL), a newly formed voluntary bar
association whose mission was to maintain the predominant
role of attorneys as settlement agents in the Commonwealth.6
2. Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-2.19
to -2.29 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.19(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
4. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3909 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
5. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3905 (Repl. Vol. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
246.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
6. See Patricia Flatley, Coalition to VaREAL: "Get real," 11 VA. LAW. WKLY. 185
(1996); Baker McClanahan, Showdown on Closing: UPL #183, VaREAL meets, readies
for Council, 11 VA. LAW. WKLY. 361 (1996).
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In response, another new group arose, the Coalition for Choice
in Real Estate Closing (Coalition for Choice). The mission of
Coalition for Choice was to maintain the growing market posi-
tion of lay settlement agents.! Prior to the Supreme Court of
Virginia's consideration of UPL 183, the Coalition for Choice
proposed CRESPA to the Virginia General Assembly.
CRESPA was modeled after the National Association of In-
surance Commissioner's Title Insurance Agent Model Act. It
originated in the Senate of Virginia under the patronage of
Senator Warren E. Barry.8 Although Senator Barry's bill
passed the Senate with minor modifications, it was substantial-
ly amended in the House of Delegates' Committee on Corpora-
tions, Insurance and Banking and again during floor debate in
the House of Delegates.9 VAREAL was active in proposing the
House amendments that ultimately allowed CRESPA to receive
the unanimous "aye" vote of the House and the near unanimous
"aye" vote in the Senate upon the bill's reconsideration. These
compromise amendments (i) mandated that all settlement
agents register with and pay a registration fee to the VSB, (ii)
gave the VSB the authority to promulgate guidelines to assist
settlement agents in avoiding the unauthorized practice of law,
and (iii) prohibited all settlement agents, not just lawyers, from
keeping the interest earned on escrow accounts.0
Terms defined in CRESPA include "[e]scrow, closing or settle-
ment services," "[p]arty to the real estate transaction" and
"[s]ettlement agent."" Additionally, CRESPA requires that set-
tlement agents be either attorneys licensed in Virginia, title
insurance companies or agents, licensed real estate brokers, or
regulated financial institutions.'. Further, CRESPA requires
settlement agents (other than title insurance companies or
financial institutions) to maintain the following: (i) errors and
omissions or malpractice insurance providing a minimum of
$250,000 in coverage; (ii) a blanket fidelity bond or employee
dishonesty insurance policy covering persons employed by the
7. See Flatley, supra note 6, at 185.
8. See S.B. 1104, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.20 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
12. See id. § 6.1-2.21(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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settlement agent providing a minimum of $100,000 in coverage;
and (iii) a surety bond of not less than $100,000.13 Settlement
agents, other than attorneys, are required to have annual au-
dits of their escrow accounts by either an independent certified
public accountant or, if the settlement agent is a licensed title
insurance agency, by its title insurance company.'4
The legislature also required that all sales contracts involving
the purchase of real estate containing four or less residential
dwelling units include the following in bold face, and 10 point
type:
Choice of Settlement Agent: You have the right to select a
settlement agent to handle the closing of this transaction.
The settlement agent's role in closing your transaction in-
volves the coordination of numerous administrative and
clerical functions relating to the collection of documents and
the collection and disbursement of funds required to carry
out the terms of the contract between the parties. If part of
the purchase price is financed, your lender will instruct the
settlement agent as to the signing and recording of loan
documents and the disbursement of loan proceeds. No set-
tlement agent can provide legal advice to any party to the
transaction except a settlement agent who is engaged in the
private practice of law in Virginia and who has been re-
tained or engaged by a party to the transaction for the
purpose of providing legal services to that party.
Escrow, closing and settlement service guidelines: The Vir-
ginia State Bar issues guidelines to help settlement agents
avoid and prevent the unauthorized practice of law in con-
nection with furnishing escrow, settlement or closing servic-
es. As a party to a real estate transaction, you are entitled
to receive a copy of these guidelines from your settlement
agent, upon request, in accordance with the provisions of
Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act.15
Further conditioning a settlement agent's ability to escrow
funds or conduct settlements, the General Assembly required
the following: (i) the funds deposited shall be handled in a
fiduciary capacity and be kept in a separate fiduciary trust
13. See id. § 6.1-2.21(D) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
14. See id. § 6.1-2.21(E) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
15. Id. § 6.1-2.22 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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account; (ii) escrow funds be applied and/or disbursed only in
accordance with the terms of instructions or agreements, HUD-
1 Settlement Statements which have been signed by the seller
and the purchaser or borrower shall be deemed sufficient; and
(iii) the settlement agent not retain any interest received on
funds deposited in connection with any escrow, settlement or
closing." Although attorneys historically have been prohibited
from earning interest on their escrow accounts, no such restric-
tion existed for non-attorney settlement agents.
The VSB will register attorney settlement agents as well as
all other settlement agents. 7 The VSB registration require-
ment requires each licensed Virginia attorney who conducts a
settlement service to register and does not permit the singular
registration of a law firm." Non-attorney settlement agents
who are licensed entities, shall only be required to register the
entity, not the individual employees of the entity. 9 The Act
specifically confers to the VSB the power to continue to regu-
late the unauthorized practice of law.20 However, the State
Corporation Commission shall police the compliance of financial
institutions and the title insurance industry with other aspects
of CRESPA and the Virginia Real Estate Board, shall perform
the same function for licensed real estate brokers.2' The split
between the jurisdictional authority of the administrative agen-
cies is intricate.
CRESPA even mandated that the VSB should consult with
the State Corporation Commission and the Virginia Real Estate
Board in the development of guidelines concerning the unau-
thorized practice of law.' A subcommittee of the VSB, com-
16. See id. § 6.1-2.23(AX1), (AX2), (B), (C) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
17. See id. § 6.1-2.25 to -2.26 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
18. See Virginia State Bar Proposed Regulations Under the Virginia Consumer
Real Estate Settlement Protection Act, 45 VA. LAW. REG. 13, 14 (1997).
19. See id.
20. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.26 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
21. See id. §§ 6.1-2.25 to -2.26 (Cum. Supp. 1997). It is interesting to note that
federally chartered banking institutions are regulated by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency at the Unit-
ed State Department of Treasury or by the Office of Thrift Supervision. Federally
chartered financial institutions, therefore, shall avoid all regulation under CRESPA.
One wonders whether the General Assembly should reexamine this hole in the legis-
lation.
22. See id. § 6.1-2.26(B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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posed of members of each of these agencies, met in the spring
of 1997 and drafted the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Guidelines for Real Estate Settlement Agents ("Guidelines").
The Guidelines were adopted pursuant to Virginia Code section
6.1-2.26(c), in accordance with the by-laws of the VSB.2 Susan
M. Pesner, co-author of this article, was a member of this sub-
committee.
In the future, the VSB shall receive all complaints concerning
a settlement agent's or financial institution's noncompliance
with the Guidelines.' A non-lawyer employee of a law firm
settlement agent who commits an act constituting the unautho-
rized practice of law may be guilty of a misdemeanor, fined up
to $2500 and imprisoned for up to twelve months.' Unless the
attorney settlement agent is "engaged in the private practice of
law in Virginia and ... has been retained or engaged by a
party to the transaction for the purpose of providing legal ser-
vices to that party," the attorney settlement agent is prohibited
from providing legal advice to the parties. 6 If any settlement
agent violates CRESPA or any CRESPA regulation, the appro-
priate licensing authority may (i) order a penalty not exceeding
$5,000 for each violation; (ii) revoke or suspend the applicable
license(s); or (iii) impose any other penalties as provided by law
or regulation. 27 CRESPA requires all settlement agents to re-
tain records pertaining to each settlement handled for a mini-
mum of five years after the settlement is completed.' It
should be noted that the five-year statute of limitations under a
written contract29 would start to run when the work of the
settlement agent is completed. The authors recommend that a
settlement agent keep their files for five years from the last
23. Proposed State Bar CRESPA Guidelines for Real Estate Settlement Agents, 45
VA. LAW. REG. 18, 18-20 (1997).
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.26 (Cune. Supp. 1997).
25. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3904 (Repl. Vol. 1994) (providing that the unautho-
rized practice of law is a class 1 misdemeanor, the penalty for which is found in VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (Repl. Vol. 1996)). An attorney settlement agent cannot be found
guilty of the unauthorized practice of law since he or she is a licensed Virginia law-
yer.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.22 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
27. See id. § 6.1-2.27 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
28. See id. § 6.1-2.24 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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date work was competed (i.e., the recording of the release of the
prior liens).
The State Corporation Commission already implemented stat-
utes governing the affairs of persons engaged in the title insur-
ance business"° and issued Administration Letter 1997-1, dated
March 10, 1997, to assist its licensees in complying with exist-
ing statutes and regulations.
B. Property Owners' Association Act
When originally enacted, the Virginia Property Owners' Asso-
ciation Act"' specifically allowed a purchaser of a property lo-
cated within a qualified homeowners' association, to waive, by
separate agreement, the rights of the purchaser to receive and
the obligations of the seller to deliver the resale packet from
the homeowners association. The 1997 legislative amendment
deleted, in its entirety, the right of the purchaser to sign a
separate waiver,2 thereby leaving a residential real estate con-
tract contingent until three days after delivery of the resale
packet to the purchaser (without action by a purchaser to uni-
laterally cancel) or upon the completion of settlement, whichev-
er occurs first.
C. Licensing Statute for Real Estate Salespersons and Brokers
The Virginia Association of Realtors® was successful in per-
suading the 1997 Virginia legislature to enact an amendment
allowing real estate salespersons and brokers to "prepare writ-
ten contracts for the sale, purchase, option, exchange, or rental
of real estate provided the preparation of such contracts is inci-
dental to a real estate transaction in which the licensee (i) is
involved and (ii) does not charge a separate fee for preparing
the contracts."" Moreover, a licensee having a substantive dis-
cussion about a specific property or properties with a prospec-
tive buyer or seller need only disclose the brokerage relation-
30. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-1809, -1810, -1812, -1813, -1820 to -1825, -1832 to
-1834 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-511 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
32. Id. § 55-511 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2101.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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ship the licensee has with another party to the transaction if
the prospective participant to the transaction is not represented
by another licensee.'
D. Banking Statutes Enlarging the Rights of Lenders to Accel-
erate Loans
Mortgage lenders also received new protections this past
legislative session. A licensed mortgage lender or broker may
prepare an agreement that contains an acceleration clause per-
mitting all sums owed under a mortgage loan to be declared
due if a borrower fails to pay his/her loan, submits false infor-
mation in connection with an application for the mortgage loan,
breaches any representation or covenant in the loan documents,
or fails to perform any other obligation in the loan docu-
ments.35
E. Homeowners Associations and Condominium Associations
Amendments to both the homeowners' association and the
condominium association statutes now require such associations
to register with the Virginia Real Estate Board and to include
in their respective resale certificates the association's registra-
tion number and date of registration with the Real Estate
Board."6 This requirement is part of the General Assembly's
effort, beginning in 1993, to persuade common-interest commu-
nities to adopt enlightened management and dispute resolution
mechanisms. 7
At the same time the General Assembly is gradually mandat-
ing state regulation of common interest associations, it also is
giving such associations significant new powers. The General
Assembly passed legislation that authorizes condominium asso-
ciations and property owners' associations to enforce their liens
for assessments in non-judicial foreclosures.' In the opinion of
34. See id. § 54.1-2138 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
35. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-422 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
36. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.97, -484, -512, -530 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
37. See id. § 55-530 (Gum. Supp. 1997).
38. See id. §§ 55-79.84, -516 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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the authors, this legislative action definitively tips the balance
of power in favor of the common-interest ownership associations
vis-a-vis the associations' members.
F. Land Records
Both the state executive branch and the General Assembly
have been studying proposals to consolidate Virginia land re-
cords in a central administrative agency. During the 1996 ses-
sion, the General Assembly increased the taxes clerks of court
may charge so that monies could be set aside in a special tech-
nology fund.9 It was anticipated the fund would be expended
to purchase computer equipment necessary to scan and digitize
land records." As originally conceived, the Department of In-
formation Technology (DIT) was intended to be the central
repository of all land records, thereby significantly diminishing
the stature of local clerks.41 The clerks fought back this ses-
sion, however, and wrested control of the centralization project
away from the DIT.42 The General Assembly requested the
Council on Information Management to develop protocols
whereby land records would remain in the possession of local
clerks, but would be accessible on-line in a standardized for-
mat.43
G. Fishing Rights
It did not make the front page of the news, but the General
Assembly passed legislation making it a Class three misde-
meanor for anyone to impede a licensed fisherman from fishing
in tidal or inland waters within the Commonwealth." Un-
39. See VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-125.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
40. See id.
41. See Baker McClanahan, All Land Records May Go In Central Database, 11
VA. LAW. WKLY., 681, 684 (1996).
42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-125.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
43. See idL
44. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 28.2-903.1, and 29.1-554.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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doubtedly, this legislative action was a response to the Supreme
Court of Virginia's decision in Kraft v. Burr,45 discussed below.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Nuisances
In the tragic case of Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach,46
the Supreme Court of Virginia found that a public beach is a
recreational facility under Virginia Code section 15.1-291 and
that in order to recover under this section, the claimant must
prove the municipality was guilty of gross negligence." In
Chapman, a nine-year-old child strangled herself when she
caught her head in an access gate to a public beach. The lower
court dismissed the plaintiff's nuisance count, finding that it
was subsumed in the count for negligence." In reversing this
decision, the supreme court held that negligence and nuisance
are distinct concepts, especially because negligence is only one
of the two alternative prerequisites required to impose liability
on a municipality in a nuisance cause of action.49 The City
contended that section 15.1-291 required a finding of gross
negligence before the imposition of liability upon it, even for
nuisance actions, but the supreme court deferred ruling on this
issue until the later case of Hawthorn v. City of Richmond."
In Hawthorn, a majority of the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that Virginia Code section 15.1-291 abrogated the com-
mon law and that the General Assembly specifically intended
the section to reverse the 4 to 3 holding of Hoggard v. City of
Richmond51 in which the Supreme Court of Virginia imposed
liability upon a municipality for the negligent operation of a
swimming pool.5" Accordingly, the majority found that in order
for a municipality operating a recreational facility to be liable,
45. 252 Va. 273, 476 S.E.2d 715 (1996).
46. 252 Va. 186, 475 S.E.2d 798 (1996).
47. See id. at 189, 475 S.E.2d at 800.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 192-93, 475 S.E.2d at 802.
50. 253 Va. 283, 484 S.E.2d 603 (1997).
51. 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939).
52. See Hawthorn, 253 Va. at 287, 484 S.E.2d at 605; Hoggard, 172 Va. at 157,
200 S.E. at 615-16.
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it must be found grossly negligent in a personal injury action,
and it is irrelevant whether the condition complained of consti-
tuted a nuisance.53 Justice Stephenson's dissent, in which Jus-
tice Hassell joined, departed from the majority's decision on the
issue of how strictly the supreme court should construe an
abrogation of the common law." Justice Stephenson held that
Virginia Code section 15.1-291 must be strictly construed be-
cause it is in abrogation of the common law."5 However, strict
reading reveals that the section makes no reference to nuisanc-
es. Therefore, Justice Stephenson concluded, the General As-
sembly did not intend to abrogate the common law.56
Outside the context of recreational facilities, the lower courts
continued to apply traditional sovereign immunity concepts. The
Loudoun Circuit Court held that the issues raised in a
municipality's plea of sovereign immunity must be raised at
trial because the municipality introduced insufficient evidence
in support of its plea.57 At trial the defendant must prove that
the municipality acted with authority and did not act negligent-
ly." Applying the same principles to another case, the Rich-
mond Circuit Court held that the plaintiff alleged sufficient
facts to state a cause of action for nuisance when she allegedly
fell over a chain strung between two posts and injured herself
while attending a baseball game." The city would be entitled
to the protection of sovereign immunity if the condition claimed
to be a nuisance was authorized by law and the creation or
maintenance of the nuisance was not negligent.' Obviously,
the Richmond Circuit Court decision is now questionable in
light of Hawthorn.
53. See Hawthorn, 253 Va. at 289, 484 S.E.2d at 606.
54. See id. at 290, 484 S.E.2d at 607 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
55. See id. (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 291, 484 S.E.2d at 607 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
57. See Parrott v. Town of Hamilton, 39 Va. Cir. 224 (Loudoun County 1996).
58. See id.
59. See Hutchinson v. Richmond Metro. Auth., 39 Va. Cir. 230, 233 (Richmond
City 1996).
60. See id. at 232 (citing City of Virginia Beach v. Virinia Beach Steel Fishing
Pier, Inc., 212 Va. 425, 427, 184 S.E.2d 749, 750-51 (1971)).
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B. Easements
1. Express Easements
Construing an express easement, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held in Walton v. Capital Land, Inc."' that an easement
in gross reserved by the grantor and described in the deed as
"an exclusive easement of right of way for purposes of ingress
and egress" did not prohibit that grantee from all uses of the
land covered by the easement.62 In reversing the lower court,
the supreme court held that the trial court's decision prohibit-
ing the grantee from using the easement "transmuted a grant
of an easement into the grant of a possessory interest or an
estate by allowing the owner of the easement to deprive the
servient estate owner of the use of his land.' ° Since the deed
limited the easement to a "right of way" and for "ingress and
egress" purposes only, the supreme court held a fee simple con-
veyance was not intended."
The Supreme Court of Virginia had more difficulty determin-
ing the scope of an express easement in Auerbach v. County of
Hanover.' The description of the easement at issue was as fol-
lows,
[the grantors] hereby reserve an easement of right-of-way
50 feet in width along the western line of parcel A leading
from State Route 606 to Parcel B as a means of ingress and
egress to and from Parcel B and State Route 606, said
easement being shown as lying on the westerly side of Par-
cel A on the hereinabove described plat.'
A local zoning official found that the Parcel A easement did not
serve a large section of the property and denied a resubdivision
application for lack of access. 7 Did the Parcel A easement
serve all of the property or only Parcel B? Which Parcel B?
61. 252 Va. 324, 477 S.E.2d 499 (1996).
62. See id. at 327, 477 S.E.2d at 501.
63. Id. at 326, 477 S.E.2d at 501.
64. See id. at 327, 477 S.E.2d at 501.
65. 252 Va. 410, 478 S.E.2d 100 (1996).
66. Id. at 412, 478 S.E.2d at 101.
67. See id. at 413, 478 S.E.2d at 101.
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Unfortunately, the subject parcels were replatted twice." A
majority of the court held the easement's scope was clear when
one considered the revised plat."s The majority further deter-
mined that the second replatting consolidated the land holdings
because of the phrase "added-on."70 Chief Justice Carrico in a
tersely worded dissent, joined by Justices Hassell and Keenan,
called the "add-on" language incomprehensible.7
As it is, I think that the language used adds nothing even
remotely connecting the use of the easement to the 122.5-
acre tract. At least, I hope we have not yet reached the
point where we will allow such meaningless language to be
considered sufficient to affect estates in land. 2
Turning to less contentious matters, the Rockingham Circuit
Court held that a plat indicating a right of way that abuts and
appears to serve two parcels of land is a deeded easement for
the benefit of both parcels, even if the deeds to the parcels did
not refer to the easement.73 The King George Circuit Court
found that where an express reciprocal easement burdened
several lots in a subdivision and did not limit the use thereof,
the easement could be used for any reasonable purpose.74 How-
ever, the trial court held that the owners of a subservient es-
tate could not construct fences or park vehicles and thereby
obstruct the enjoyment of the easement.7'
2. Prescriptive Easement
Courts construe the scope of prescriptive easements much
more narrowly and require more difficult proof than for express
easements. A plaintiff suing to establish a prescriptive ease-
ment for commercial logging failed to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence the existence of the easement claimed.7' On
68. See id.
69. See i . at 414-15, 478 S.E.2d at 102.
70. See id. at 415-16, 478 S.E.2d at 102.
71. See Ud. at 417, 478 S.E.2d at 103 (Carrico, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Carrico, C.J., dissenting).
73. See Cave v. Mitchell, 40 Va. Cir. 427, 427-28 (Rockingham County 1996).
74. See Rose v. Durst, 38 Va. Cir. 358, 359 (King George County 1996).
75. See id.
76. See Hastings v. Franklin, 39 Va. Cir. 340, 343 (Shenandoah County 1996).
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the other hand, the plaintiff did prove a prescriptive easement
for hunting and cutting firewood.7
C. Condemnation
During the period covered by this survey article, the courts
have provided some clarification of a landowner's responsibility
to return funds withdrawn from the state during the course of
condemnation actions. The Supreme Court of Virginia held in
Transportation Commissioner v. Matyiko' that directors of a
corporation are required to repay the amounts withdrawn
pursuant to a condemnation certificate when the commissioners
award less than the certificate amount and the directors vote to
make a distribution of the funds withdrawn on the certificate
without making adequate provision for contingent liabilities. 9
Similarly, the Fairfax Circuit Court held that where a landown-
er receives funds pursuant to a withdrawal order requiring him
to repay the funds in the event that the condemnation award is
less than the certificate amount, the landowner is obligated to
repay such funds even though the withdrawn funds were paid
directly to the landowner's lender, rather than to the landown-
er. 8
The Stafford Circuit Court held when valuing land for con-
demnation purposes, "comparables" must be similar in locality
and in character to the land in question and the "developmen-
tal cost" method of valuation of undeveloped land is too specu-
lative to be admissible as evidence." The Fredericksburg Cir-
cuit Court held in an inverse condemnation action that the
property owners had no compensable right to a view from their
property.82 Finally, the Accomack Circuit Court decided that a
school board, which had acquired title to the land by voluntary
conveyance, could not file a condemnation suit against the for-
77. See id.
78. 253 Va. 1, 481 S.E.2d 468 (1997).
79. See id. at 10, 481 S.E.2d at 472.
80. See Transportation Comm'r v. Lynch, 39 Va. Cir. 124, 127 (Fairfax County
1996).
81. See Stafford Reg' Airport Comm'n v. Lawrence, 39 Va. Cir. 179, 180 (Stafford
County 1996).
82. See Johnson v. Virginia Dep't of Transp., 39 Va. Cir. 157, 158 (Fredericksburg
City 1996).
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mer owner to remove that owner's tenant from the land.'
Rather, the condemnor must file either an action at law against
the tenant or institute condemnation proceedings directly
against the tenant.
D. Cotenancy
In Butler v. Hayes,85 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that coparcenaries may not receive reimbursement for improve-
ments in a partition action, if they have reason to know that
the deed by which they acquired title from the other coparce-
naries was procured by forgery." The supreme court stated
that the equitable adjustment between coparcenaries or coten-
ants was meant to prevent one tenant from becoming enriched
at the expense of another." However, in order to invoke an
equitable remedy, the litigant must have clean hands. Here the
coparcener seeking relief built the subject improvements with
knowledge of allegations that his title was a forgery. Thus, the
cotenant had unclean hands."8 Likewise, the cotenant may not
obtain relief under Virginia Code section 8.01-166 because a
claimant under that section must have no notice of a title de-
fect.89
E. Deeds
1. Construction
In perhaps the most controversial and far-reaching decision of
the year, the Supreme Court of Virginia held in a 4 to 3 deci-
sion that owners of land who could trace their title back to
patents made by two British monarchs could exclude fishermen
83. See Accomack County Sch. Bd. v. Shields, 39 Va. Cir. 411, 413 (Accomack
County 1996).
84. See id.
85. 254 Va. 38, 487 S.E.2d 229 (1997).
86. See id. at 43-44, 487 S.E.2d at 232.
87. See id. at 43, 487 S.E.2d at 232.
88. See id. at 43-44, 487 S.E.2d at 232.
89. See id. at 44, 487 S.E.2d at 232-33; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-166 (Repl. Vol.
1992 & Cur. Supp. 1997).
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from a navigable waterway, in this case, the Jackson River."
Holding that the Magna Carta did not prohibit the British
Crown from granting exclusive rights to fish, a majority of the
supreme court in Kraft v. Burr held that the patent from King
George II to William Jackson gave title to his successors-in-title
in that section of the Jackson River adjoining their property.91
In regards to a second patent, one to Richard Morris from King
George III, the supreme court found that the patent also in-
cluded the exclusive right to fish because "the use of the word
'etc.' in the patent records was a short-hand phrase used to
incorporate by reference terms in the original patents," and the
patent form commonly used during the tenure of Governor
Alexander Spotswood included an interest in river bottoms and
the right to fish.92 Chief Justice Carrico joined the majority
concerning the Jackson patent and joined the dissent concern-
ing the Morris patent. Chief Justice Carrico felt the majority's
decision on the Morris patent involved too much guesswork.9"
In his dissent, Justice Koontz disputed the majority's view that
the British Crown had the right to grant exclusive fishing
rights." Justice Koontz felt that as long as a fisherman re-
mained in navigable waters and did not touch the banks or
drag the stream with nets, anchors or seines, he could not be
stopped by the holder of a crown patent.9" Justice Koontz may
have had the last laugh, however. The General Assembly
passed a law making it a misdemeanor to obstruct the right of
a licensed fishermen from fishing in inland or tidal waters."
2. Capacity
In Hill v. Brooks,97 the Supreme Court of Virginia overruled
a lower court's decision to nullify a conveyance by deed of gift
90. See Kraft v. Burr, 252 Va. 273, 476 S.E.2d 715 (1996).
91. See id. at 277, 476 S.E.2d at 717.
92. Id. at 279, 476 S.E.2d at 718.
93. See id. at 281, 476 S.E.2d at 719 (Carrico, C.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
94. See id. at 282, 476 S.E.2d at 720 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 284, 476 S.E.2d at 721.
96. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 28.2-903.1, 29.1-554.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
97. 253 Va. 168, 482 S.E.2d 816 (1997).
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on the basis of lack of capacity, fraud and unilateral mistake.9"
After stating that the party attempting to void a conveyance
must prove the grounds therefore by clear and convincing evi-
dence, the supreme court found that the grantor, plaintiff in
the suit, failed to prove his own incapacity, especially because
the attorney who drafted the deed gave unrebutted testimony
that the grantor understood the nature of the transaction and
agreed to its provisions.' Moreover, the supreme court would
not set aside the conveyance for lack of consideration because it
said "by definition, a deed of gift requires no consideration.""°
F. Restrictive Covenants
The Supreme Court of Virginia had several opportunities to
interpret restrictive covenants during the period covered by this
article. These opinions, however, did not break new ground. In
Anderson v. Lake Arrowhead Civic Ass'n,"°' the supreme court
narrowed the scope of the Virginia Property Owners' Associ-
ation Act"° (POAA) to apply only to those developments in
which the declaration requires the association to maintain com-
mon areas and specially empowers the association to make
maintenance assessments. The POAA is inapplicable, in in-
stances similar to the Lake Arrowhead case, where the associa-
tion is merely empowered to make assessments, but is not ob-
ligated to do so."0 3 In Woodward v. Morgan,'4 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held, in a divided opinion, that a prohibition
against building more than one residence per "lot" was not
ambiguous even though the original grantor conveyed sites in
the subdivision containing more than one "lot" to the same
purchasers and the covenant refers to "residences" located on
the lot."5 Justice Keenan, in her dissent, argued that the
majority had no reason to assume that "lot" in the restrictive
98. See id. at 179, 482 S.E.2d at 823.
99. See id. at 176, 482 S.E.2d at 821.
100. Id. at 178, 482 S.E.2d at 823.
101. 253 Va. 264, 271-72, 483 S.E.2d 209, 213 (1997).
102. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-508 to -516.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
103. See Anderson, 253 Va. at 271-72, 483 S.E.2d at 213.
104. 252 Va. 135, 475 S.E.2d 808 (1996).
105. See id. at 138, 475 S.E.2d at 810.
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covenants had the same meaning as "lot" in the property
description.'
The Fairfax Circuit Court found that a restrictive covenant
authorizing a homeowners association to assess expenses neces-
sary "to promote the recreation, health, safety and welfare of
the residents" gave the association sufficient power to require
an individual homeowner to pay for the community's trash
collection, even though the defendant homeowner had diligently
removed his trash. °"
G. Construction /Workmanship
While the Supreme Court of Virginia failed to issue any opin-
ions concerning construction contracts and builder warranties,
circuit court opinions continued to perform their useful role of
filling in the gaps. The Spotsylvania Circuit Court held that a
cause of action for breach of an implied warranty under Virgin-
ia Code section 55-70.1 accrues upon the passage of title to the
purchaser."° Since the statute of limitations for the implied
statutory warranty is two years, the circuit court held at sum-
mary judgment that the purchaser's cause of action was time-
barred.'" Another lower court held that when the purchasers
bought a home by purchasing the stock of a sole-asset corpora-
tion, they were not entitled to rely upon the implied statutory
warranties under Virginia Code section 55-70.1."' According
to the circuit court, only contracts for the sale of new dwellings
fall within the ambit of that statute, not contracts for the pur-
chase of stock."'
A good cause of action, however, does not ensure satisfaction
of the judgment. In Jeffries v. Virginia Board for Contrac-
tors,"' the Fairfax Circuit Court affirmed a decision of the
106. See id. at 140, 475 S.E.2d at 811 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
107. See Prosperity Heights Homeowner Ass'n v. George, 38 Va. Cir. 88, 90
(Fairfax County 1995).
108. See Grogg v. Massey & Leonard Constr., Inc., 39 Va. Cir. 522, 524
(Spotsylvania County 1996).
109. See id.
110. See Ell v. Moss, 39 Va. Cir. 8, 16 (Fairfax County 1995).
111. See id.
112. 38 Va. Cir. 251 (Fairfax County 1995).
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Virginia Real Estate Board denying a developer's claim filed
pursuant to the Virginia Contractor Transaction Recovery
Act 113 (VCTRA). In so holding, the circuit court found that
VCTRA specifically excluded recovery by anyone whose business
involves the development of property."4  The claimant in
Jeffries fit this definition since she had entered into an infor-
mal partnership with the builder in question to construct a
home for resale."'
Large claimants can have difficulty recovering as well. A resi-
dential home builder could not obtain indemnification from the
manufacturers of flame-retardant treated plywood for replace-
ment costs because the builder was merely a volunteer and did
not give the defendant manufacturers an opportunity to defend
the homeowner claims."6 The theory of recovery selected can
be crucial. For instance, the developer of a subdivision was
entitled to enforce the agreement between a lot purchaser and
a construction company in which the latter agreed to pay the
developer a marketing fee of five percent of the contract
price." In holding for the developer suing as a third-party
beneficiary, the circuit court found, after a trial ore tenus, that
the developer was an intended beneficiary under the parties'
contract and that parol evidence was inadmissible since the
contract was unambiguous."'
In an administrative law decision, the Supreme Court of
Virginia probably closed the book on an issue that caused much
controversy---shrink/swelF soil in Chesterfield County. In this
most'recent installment of the dispute between residential home
builders and consumers, the supreme court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Chesterfield County building permit fee of $125
in W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors."9 The County
used building permit fees to investigate "shrink/swell" soil in
Chesterfield. The supreme court held the County's building
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-1118 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
114. See Jeffries, 38 Va. Cir. at 252-53.
115. See id. at 253.
116. See Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 39 Va. Cir. 107, 115-16
(Fairfax County 1996).
117. See Fairfield Williamsburg, Inc. v. Governor's Land Ass'n, 40 Va. Cir. 312
(Williamsburg City and James City County 1996).
118. See id- at 317.
119. 252 Va. 377, 384, 478 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996).
1997] 1163
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1145
permit fee did not constitute special legislation since it did not
"arbitrarily separate[ I some persons, places, or things from
those on which, without such separation, it would also oper-
ate."" Also, after examining statutes and regulations perti-
nent to the Chesterfield program, the supreme court found that
the imposition of the permit fee was not ultra vires.'2 '
H. Mechanics' Liens
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in United Savings Ass'n
v. Jim Carpenter Co." that materialmen supplying materials
for a construction site under a specific continuing contract, as
distinguished from marketplace providers under an open ac-
count, are entitled to perfect their mechanic's liens ninety days
from the date they last delivered items.1" In Jim Carpenter
Co., the supreme court heard three cases on appeal, two of
which the lower courts held that the materialmen were not en-
titled to liens for much of the supplies given because they ob-
tained separate contracts for each delivery." The supreme
court established a test to distinguish open accounts from par-
ticular continuing contracts:
[w]here the course of dealing between the parties shows
that each understood that the materials were being sup-
plied for a particular project, rather than merely for general
use by the contractor, and nothing in the record suggests
that a mere open account was intended, a continuing con-
tract will be found.'
Applying this test to the three cases on appeal, a unanimous
supreme court found that the contracts in each case were con-
tinuing contracts."
A lower court addressed the novel issue of whether an archi-
tect may assert a mechanic's lien for work done in connection
120. Id.
121. See id. at 385-86, 478 S.E.2d at 301.
122. 252 Va. 252, 475 S.E.2d 788 (1996).
123. See id. at 264, 475 S.E.2d at 794.
124. See id. at 257-59, 475 S.E.2d at 790-91.
125. Id. at 261, 475 S.E.2d at 793.
126. See id. at 264, 475 S.E.2d at 794.
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with soil testing and the development of plans that were later
used by others in the construction of a building.' The
Loudoun Circuit Court held that the architect's lien was invalid
because the architect's work-product did not enhance the value
of the property against which the lien was being asserted.'
I. Brokers
When does a commercial real estate broker's lien come into
existence? When the lien is filed in the land records or when
the broker performs services? In Harrison & Bates, Inc v.
Featherstone Ass'n,' the Supreme Court of Virginia answered
that a real estate broker's lien exists, if at all, only when the
required filing occurs. The supreme court distinguished the
commercial broker's lien from mechanics' liens, in which the
claimant may obtain an inchoate lien from the date the work or
materials were provided. 3 ' The supreme court narrowly con-
strued the Commercial Real Estate Broker's Lien Act'3 ' be-
cause it is in derogation of the common law.' The real estate
brokers received their revenge in another case. When a seller
contributed his land to a limited liability company in exchange
for that company's assumption of the debt secured by the land,
the Supreme Court of Virginia held in Hagan v. Adams Proper-
ty Associates, Inc.' that the seller owed his real estate bro-
ker a commission." The supreme court found that the seller's
contribution to the limited liability company in exchange for
membership interest in the company was more than a mere
change in the form of ownership." Finally, the Richmond
Circuit Court found that a broker could not recover damages
because he failed to prove an oral exclusive right-to-sell agree-
127. See Fort Evans Ass'n v. Davis Buckley, P.C., 38 Va. Cir. 155, 155 (Loudoun
County 1995).
128. See id. at 158.
129. 253 Va. 364, 370-71, 484 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997).
130. See id. at 370, 484 S.E.2d at 886-87.
131. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-526 to -527 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
132. See Harrison & Bates, 253 Va. at 370-71, 484 S.E.2d at 887.
133. 253 Va. 217, 482 S.E.2d 805 (1997).
134. See id. at 221, 482 S.E.2d at 808.
135. See id. at 220, 482 S.E.2d at 807.
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ment and failed to prove that he was the procuring cause of the
sale."
J. Lis Pendens
The circuit courts heard two lis pendens actions that were
prominently featured in professional publications. A builder who
planned to buy finished lots from a developer was entitled to a
vendee's lien upon the developer's breach of a purchase agree-
ment."7 In so holding, the Fairfax Circuit Court also stated
that a party filing a memorandum of lis pendens may seek to
establish an interest in the subject property, but not title."
The circuit court further held that a vendee's lien is recogniz-
able under Virginia common law since such liens are recognized
elsewhere and Virginia does enforce equitable liens.3 ' In the
second case, the Loudoun Circuit Court awarded sanctions
against a defendant for filing a memorandum of lis pendens in
a suit that could not possibly affect title to the land." The
circuit court held that a memorandum of lis pendens cannot be
based on litigation that does not assert jurisdiction over an
owner of the land or over the land itself.'
K. Appraisers
In a decision that should serve as a warning to real estate
litigators, a circuit court held that a power company could not
introduce its expert witness to testify to the value of proper-
ty." The court interpreted the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Lee Gardens Ltd. Partnership v. Arlington County
Board" to mean that persons receiving compensation for
their appraisal opinion cannot testify in court as to the value of
136. See Virginia Bus. Exch., Inc. v. Matthews, 38 Va. Cir. 370, 372 (Richmond
City 1996).
137. See DRHI v. L'Ambiance Assocs., 39 Va. Cir. 434, 435 (Fairfax County 1996).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See CMF Loudoun, L.P. v. Brown, 39 Va. Cir. 101, 104 (Loudoun County
1996).
141. See id. at 103.
142. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Orr, 40 Va. Cir. 370 (Washington County 1996).
143. 250 Va. 534, 463 S.E.2d 646 (1996).
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real estate unless they are licensed.' 4 The Washington Circuit
Court refused to depart from the holding of Lee Gardens even
though the General Assembly passed an amendment effective
July 1, 1995, (prior to the Lee Gardens decision) which states
that "nothing construed herein shall proscribe the power[s] of a
judge to determine who may qualify as an expert witness to
testify in any legal proceeding." 45
L. Settlement Agents
Addressing the dual agency role of settlement agents, the
Fairfax Circuit Court dismissed a motion for judgment finding"
that between a seller and buyer of real property, the seller
bears the loss when an escrow holder absconds with the pro-
ceeds of sale after the seller has become legally entitled to
them.'" The circuit court noted that an escrow agent is a
dual agent of both parties at closing and upon settlement be-
comes the agent of each of the parties with respect to those
things placed in escrow to which each party becomes enti-
tled. 47 Once closing occurs, the seller is legally entitled to the
proceeds of sale, and accordingly, bears the risk if the settle-
ment agent absconds with them."
M. Fire Insurance
The Fairfax Circuit Court held that a casualty insurer has
the qualified right to repair, rebuild or replace damaged proper-
ty.' On the other hand, where the insured and the insurer
are attempting to settle the claim, under Virginia Code section
38.2-517 the insurer may not force the insured to accept its
contractors as a prerequisite to settlement.5 ' In another case
originating from the same court, it was held that a lender was
144. See Appalachian Power Co., 40 Va. Cir. at 370.
145. Id. at 371 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2010 (Cum. Supp. 1997)).
146. See Perkins v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 38 Va. Cir. 71, 72 (Fairfax County
1995).
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Allstate Ins. v. Moody, 39 Va. Cir. 429, 431 (Fairfax County 1996).
150. See id. at 432. The insured may choose a cash settlement at an appraised
value in lieu of accepting the insurer's contractor. See id.
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entitled to all of the proceeds of an insurance policy, as provid-
ed in the deed of trust, even though the lender had foreclosed
on the property for the amount of the secured indebtedness.'51
N. Condominiums
The Virginia Beach Circuit Court held that members of an
unincorporated condominium association are not liable for the
acts of another member of the association, unless the associa-
tion's agent or officer committed a tort in the course of his or
her duties or the association breached an independent duty that
it owed to the injured party.52 Interjecting itself into gover-
nance issues, the Alexandria Circuit Court held that a suit to
compel the condominium association to re-count ballots cast at
an annual meeting was proper because courts have inherent
equitable jurisdiction to review elections when a property right
is at issue and the plaintiff need not join every condominium
unit owner to such suit."
0. Real Estate Taxes
Several real estate assessment cases were reported this past
year despite the diminishing number of bad assessment cases.
The Chesterfield Circuit Court held that no authority specifical-
ly requires an aggrieved taxpayer to appeal to the Board of
Equalization prior to seeking relief in circuit court."M In other
cases, taxpayers failed to rebut the presumption of the validity
of the real estate assessments, and it was held that a taxpayer
could not introduce a discounted cash-flow analysis to prove the
value of real estate because the technique is too speculative."'
151. See Clay v. First Union Natl Bank, 39 Va. Cir. 43, 54-55 (Fairfax County
1995).
152. See Croker-Sanford v. Landrum, 40 Va. Cir. 282, 283-84 (Virginia Beach City
1996).
153. See Cobble v. Colecroft Station Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n, 40 Va. Cir.
105, 105 (Alexandria City 1996).
154. See Martin v. Chesterfield County, 40 Va. Cir. 210, 210 (Chesterfield County
1996).
155. See B.O.B. Title XVI, Inc. v. Loudoun County Bd. of Supervisors, 39 Va. Cir.
128, 129 (Loudoun County 1996); Fieldfare Corp. v. Loudoun County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 39 Va. Cir. 393, 393-94 (Loudoun County 1996).
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P. Mortgages
No Supreme Court of Virginia cases reported during the
period covered by this survey directly addressed mortgages and
foreclosure issues. However, the Loudoun Circuit Court held
that a mortgage that secures a negotiable instrument in the
hands of a holder in due course shares the instrument's immu-
nity from defenses." On demurrer, the Fairfax Circuit Court,
ruled that a noteholder and assignee of a mortgage had stand-
ing to sue for waste on the mortgaged property, even though
the same party lacked such a right in his capacity as the pur-
chaser of the property at a foreclosure sale."' Interestingly,
the circuit court held that the noteholder lacked the capacity to
sue for waste upon his purchase of the property at foreclosure
under the doctrine of merger." Accordingly, the case went
forward only on the plaintiffs cause of action as the assignee of
the mortgagee.'59
Trial courts issued two published opinions concerning a
trustee's duties in foreclosure sales. In a widely followed case,
the Warren Circuit Court in Cherokee Corp. v. Chicago Title
Insurance Corp."6 held that a trustee in a foreclosure sale is
the agent of both the debtor and creditor and has a duty to
obtain the highest and best price for the property.'6 ' In this
case, the trustee breached his fiduciary duty by announcing the
existence of a cloud on the title and then immediately proceed-
ing with the auction of the land. " Commissioners of account
may appreciate the In Re Rosenblum" opinion by the
Stafford Circuit Court. In a show cause proceeding against a
trustee who failed to file an accounting, the court held that a
trustee is not required to receive a deposit because the Virginia
156. See Loudoun County Bd. of Supervisors v. Vanguard L.P., 40 Va. Cir. 201,
203 (Loudoun County 1996).
157. See Mines Street L.L.C. v. G.D.C., Inc., 38 Va. Cir. 254, 255 (Fairfax County
1995).
158. See id. at 256.
159. See id.
160. 40 Va. Cir. "1 (Warren County 1995).
161. See id. at 6.
162. See i at 7.
163. 39 Va. Cir. 420 (Stafford County 1996).
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Code gives trustees broad discretion concerning the terms and
conditions of sale."6 Furthermore, the circuit court held the
trustee has no duty to discharge real estate tax liens when the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale merely assumes the debt en-
cumbering the property." On the other hand, the trustee
must file an accounting with the Commissioner of Accounts,
even if the sale generates no proceeds."
Q. Fixtures
In a case concerning ownership of a fixture, the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Adams Outdoor Advertising L.P. v.
Long '6 ruled in favor of the freeholder. The owner of real es-
tate terminated a billboard advertising lease with an advertis-
ing agency and claimed ownership of the billboard."6 The trial
court ruled in favor of the landowner and awarded damages
resulting from a preliminary injunction that the advertising
agency had obtained.69 In afhfring the trial court's decision
that the landowner owned the sign, the supreme court began
its analysis by stating that a fixture remains personalty, owned
by the person who erected the structure, or becomes a part of
the realty, depending upon the agreement between the par-
ties.70 Here the leases provided that the billboard was the
property of the party which erected the sign, but that party
could not be found.'' Furthermore, the leases provided that
the lessee had the right to remove the fixture, yet the original
lessee had not removed the sign. Accordingly, the party that
constructed the sign had abandoned it, and the sign now
belonged to the owner of the fee.' In reversing the lower
court's decision to award damages, the supreme court found
that the landowner failed to introduce any evidence of the dam-
164. See id. at 421.
165. See id. at 422-23.
166. See id. at 423-24.
167. 253 Va. 206, 483 S.E.2d 224 (1997).
168. See id. at 207, 483 S.E.2d at 225.
169. See id. at 208, 483 S.E.2d at 226.
170. See id. at 209, 483 S.E.2d at 226-27.
171. See id. at 208-09, 483 S.E.2d at 226-27.
172. See id. at 209, 483 S.E.2d at 226-27.
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ages that were naturally and proximately caused by the prelim-
inary injunction.7 '
R. Landlord/Tenant
In a rare, reported decision under the Virginia Fair Housing
Law' 4 (VFHL), the Portsmouth Circuit Court held that allega-
tions that a landlord discriminated against members of another
race in leasing and wrongfully terminated the plaintiffs lease
because his child associated with members of another race
constituted a good cause of action.' 5 The plaintiffs were ag-
grieved parties under the VFHL because the landlord injured
their rights to associate with members of another race. 6 Fi-
nally, the Wise Circuit Court found that a landlord does not
owe a duty to protect tenants from the criminal acts of third
persons unless the landlord knows that criminal assaults are
occurring or about to occur. 77
173. Id. at 210-11, 483 S.E.2d at 227.
174. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-96.1 to -96.23 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
175. See Stinson v. Nemie, 39 Va. Cir. 85, 86 (Portsmouth City 1996).
176. See id.
177. See Cantrell v. Norton Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 39 Va. Cir. 99, 100
(Wise County 1996).
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